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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j) 
Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY HOLDING THAT THERE 
WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN A FENCE AS A BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS BELIEVED THAT 
THE FENCE WAS A BOUNDARY WHICH INCLUDED TWO ACRES 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S DESCRIBED PROPERTY WHERE THE TRIAL 
COURT MADE NO FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT SHARED 
THAT BELIEF? 
Standard of Review: Whether a given set of facts gives rise to a 
determination of acquiescence is reviewable as a matter of law, however with some 
measure of discretion accorded the trial court. Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah 
App. 2005). 
B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING AND 
CONCLUDING THAT ACQUIESCENCE WAS SHOWN BY THE 
UNILATERAL TESTIMONY AND BELIEF OF SOME OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS THAT THE FENCE CONSTITUTED THE BOUNDARY 
WHERE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF RECORD PLAINLY DISCLOSED 
THE TWO ACRES OF THE DEFENDANTS PROJECTING INTO THE 
PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL DESCRIPTION? 
Standard of Review: Whether a given set of facts gives rise to a 
determination of acquiescence is reviewable as a matter of law, however with some 
measure of discretion accorded the trial court. Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah 
App. 2005); Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 
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1999) (Both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary 
line.) 
C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO IMPUTE 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RECORD DESCRIPTIONS TO 
NEGATE PLAINTIFFS' ASSERTED BELIEF THAT THE FENCE WAS 
THE BOUNDARY? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness in 
interpreting a statute. Sachs v. Lesser, 163 P.3d 662, 673 (Utah App. 2007); Utah 
Code Annotated § 57-4a-2. 
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN OMITTING FINDINGS 
BASED UPON RECORD TITLES SHOWN BY EXHIBITS RECEIVED IN 
EVIDENCE? 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's findings based on 
written materials, the Court of Appeals is in as good a position as the trial court to 
examine the evidence de novo and determine the facts and conclusions. Matter of 
Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988); Bench v. 
Bechtel Civil & Minerals Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah App. 1988). 
E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF FACT? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings 
of fact, but grants no deference to the district court's conclusions of law. Low v. 
City ofMonticello, 103 P.3d 130, 133 (Utah 2004); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1241 (Utah 1998). 
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F. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS PRETRIAL PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ADUDICATION THAT SILENCE ALONE IS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE ACQUIESCENCE IF THE DEFENDANT 
ALSO TREATED THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY INSTEAD OF A 
BARRIER AND LIMITING THE ISSUE FOR TRIAL AS BEING 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT TREATED THE FENCE AS A 
BOUNDARY OR AS A BARRIER UNDER UTAH'S DOCTRINE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE? 
Standard of Review: Summary Judgment is a conclusion of law and no 
deference is given to the trial court's conclusions of law. Park West Condominium 
Ass'n. Inc. v. Deppe, 153 P.3d 821, 824 (Utah App. 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs are four children of William Howard Smith, who through his 
created entities transferred a 104.87 acre tract of pasture land to his four children 
who then created four separate trusts to take title to a one-fourth interest to each 
trust with each child being named as Trustee of the child's trust. All of said 104.87 
acres are situated in Section 22 Township 2 North Range 1 West. 
The defendant has owned 65 acres of which, 63 acres are in Section 23 east 
of Section 22, and two acres are in Section 22 projecting into and surrounded on 
three sides by the plaintiffs' property. A fence along the section line between 
Sections 22 and 23 existed prior to 1949 and was maintained by parties on each side 
of the fence to contain their respective cattle. The defendants' two acres in Section 
22 was not separately fenced and was used by the plaintiffs and predecessors for 
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ditches and grazing. 
The trial court entered judgment and decree quieting title to the two acres of 
the defendants to the plaintiffs after finding a boundary by acquiescence. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 20, 2006 alleging a recent survey 
revealed to them that the fence was not on the recorded boundary and that the fence 
became a boundary by acquiescence. 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment based upon an affidavit of 
one of the plaintiffs, Cindy S. Hatch, that the only issue remaining for trial would be 
whether the defendant treated the fence as a boundary or as a barrier under Utah's 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
A bench trial on the reserved issue was held June 5, 2008, and the court made 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 5, 2008. A judgment was 
entered quieting title on September 8, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We recite the Findings of fact of the trial court as being supported by the 
evidence. However there are other undisputed facts in admitted exhibits upon 
which the court did not make findings. The eleven paragraphs of Findings of Fact 
are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT #1-11 
(R-359-362) 
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1. The plaintiffs and the defendants are neighbors. The plaintiffs' property 
is located west of the defendants' property. 
2. There has been a barbed wire fence on the east side of the plaintiffs' land 
since at least 1964. In fact, it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence 
is in the same location that it has been since 1949. 
3. That fence is the boundary between the plaintiffs' property and a number 
of other properties owned by different individuals. The fence follows a straight, or 
nearly straight, course. The fence follows the record boundaries, with one 
exception. In one portion of the fence line, the fence line does not follow the record 
boundary. Instead, the fence continues in a straight line and cuts off a two-acre 
parcel that is recorded as belonging to the defendants. That parcel ("the Parcel") is 
the basis the dispute between the parties. 
4. Both parties helped maintain the fence. 
5. The plaintiffs' property was passed down through inheritance to the 
current owners. The plaintiffs took possession of the property in 1978. All of the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors used the Parcel for farming and grazing. The 
plaintiffs were never told not to use the Parcel, and the plaintiffs were never 
informed that the Parcel belonged to the defendants. The defendants have not used 
the Parcel for any purpose, and individuals who leased the defendants' property 
likewise did not use the Parcel for any purpose. 
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6. The plaintiffs have always believed that the fence is the boundary between 
their property and the defendants' property. 
7. Both parties have grazed cattle on their respective properties. 
8. There are two ditches that follow different portions of the fence. All 
ditches are located on the west side of the fence, and are thus on the plaintiffs' side 
of the fence. 
9. The ditch that follows the portion of the fence that borders the Parcel is 
the Smith drain. There were some allegations during the litigation of the motion for 
summary judgment that the fence might have served as a barrier to livestock, and 
that the fence kept the cattle out of the drain ditch. However, the fence is only on 
one side of the ditch. As noted above, both parties ran cattle on their respective 
properties. Thus, the fence did keep the defendants' cattle out of the Smith drain, 
but there was no fence to keep the plaintiffs' cattle out of the Smith drain. In fact, 
Scott Smith testified that the plaintiffs use the Smith drain to help water their cattle. 
Thus, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was required to 
keep cattle from entering the ditch. 
10. Mack Smith is the grandson of William R. Smith, who purchased the 
property that now belongs to the plaintiffs. Mack Smith testified that the Smith 
drain was dug after the fence was constructed, and the digging of the drain had no 
effect on the location of the fence. 
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11. Marvin George testified that in approximately 1965, he, his father, and 
another gentleman were working on the fence, and had a discussion with one of the 
plaintiffs' predecessors. Marvin George testified that the substance of the 
conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants' property, 
were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the Parcel). There 
was no testimony given that showed that any of the plaintiffs knew of this 
conversation, and there is not testimony given that the plaintiffs knew after 1978 
that the Parcel was actually the defendants' property. (End of court's Findings of 
Fact). 
Additional undisputed facts are contained in the exhibits included in the 
addendum to this brief. 
As shown on pages 108-111 of the transcript of trial, the defendants' counsel 
reviewed Exhibit JT17 which is a patent from the United States of America to Heber 
C. Wood describing the south half of the southeast quarter of Section 22 which is an 
80 acre parcel which includes a four acre tract, the north two acres of which is in the 
defendants' recorded description and the south two acres became part of the 
plaintiffs recorded description. 
In that same year, 1883, the said Heber C. Wood deeded the south half of the 
southeast quarter of Section 22 excepting the four acres lying and situated in the 
northeast corner of said south half of the Southeast quarter of Section 22, which 
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four acres later became divided into two acres on the north for the defendants and 
two acres on the south for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs received their two acres as 
part of a seven acre tract, five of which are in Section 23 and two of which are in 
Section 22, in 1949 as shown by Plaintiffs Exhibits 23, 24 and 25. (R 350). The 
two acre tract of the defendant came in a deed in 1951, as part of a described 6.366 
acre tract, 4.636 of which are in Section 23 and two acres are in Section 22. 
The fence line along the section line was never changed to conform to the 
subsequent division of the four acre tract and later to two, two-acre tracts and as 
such was never a boundary for any conveyances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fence which is claimed by the Smith family to be a boundary line by 
acquiescence was found by the court to be in the same location that is has been since 
1949 (the year plaintiffs' grandfather acquired the tract along with hundreds of acres 
adjoining thereto). The only plaintiff to testify was Mack Smith who said that there 
was an old fence existing in 1949 which Smiths reconstructed in the same location 
along the section line. 
Prior to 1883, the property on both sides of the fence was owned by Heber C. 
Wood, who in 1884 deeded four acres in Section 222 to Jacob Gierisch. These four 
acres eventually were divided into two acre parcels. The South going to Smiths in 
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1949 in a description of a 7.545 acre tract of which 5.545 acres were in Section 23 
east of the fence line and 2.0 acres were west of the section line in Section 222, 
having dimensions of 231 feet east to west and 379.6 feet north to south. 
The two acres of Security Investment (Stahle), defendant were acquired in 
1951 from Luvena Winegar along with other acreage in Section 23. One description 
in the Winegar deed is that of 6.636 acres, 4.636 of which are in Section 23 and two 
acres are in Section 22 projecting into the Smith farm wit dimensions of 231 feet 
east to west and 379.6 feet north to south. 
Accordingly, the fence along the section line which was old as of 1949, was 
not a boundary to either the two acre tract of Security, nor to the two acre tract of 
Smith to the south thereof. 
The trial court entered partial summary judgment limiting the issue for trial 
stating: "Therefore, the only remaining issue for trial is whether defendant treated 
the fence as a boundary or as a barrier under Utah's doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence." (R192). There is no finding of the trial court that the "defendant" 
treated the fence as a boundary, and only recited facts relating to the use of the fence 
as a barrier to contain cattle of both parties. The court did find that Marvin George, 
of the George family which leased the defendants' property form 1965 to the time of 
trial knew that they were paying to lease two acres of Security's property which they 
were not using. Marvin George was subpoenaed by the plaintiffs and testified as a 
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witness for the plaintiff, and he testified that the reason they did not farm the two 
acres was "it wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't 
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture." (Tr 
68). 
If the trial court were correct in limiting the issue for trial to whether the 
defendants treated the fence as a barrier or a boundary, then that issue should have 
been resolved in favor of the defendant that the fence was only treated as a barrier. 
Because Marvin George was called by the plaintiffs to testify as their witness, they 
are vouching for his testimony and veracity. State v. Burke, 129 P.2d 560, 562 
(Utah 1942); Schlatter v. McCarthy, 196 P.2d 968, 975 (Utah 1948). 
Use alone is not evidence of acquiescence. Knowledge of the true boundary 
defeats a claim in acquiescence. Keith Stahle, the founder of Security was an 
attorney and the attorney who represented the plaintiffs' grandfather in the 1949 
purchase where in Stahle supplied an opinion of title. 
Mack Smith was asked if he knew Keith Stahle (Staley) and testified: 
Q Did you know Keith Stahle? 
A I knew who he was. 
Q Did you know his relationship with you father? 
A Only that they all grew up in Bountiful. 
Q Did you know that he ever represented you grandfather? 
A Keith Stahle? 
Q Yes. 
A I don't recall one way or the other. 
The trial court should not have accepted the affidavit of Cindy Hatch as 
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being sufficient for its partial summary judgment limiting the issue at trial. Her 
affidavit was unsubstantiated opinion, conjecture and belief. 
The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither party does 
anything about it for a long period of time will not establish it as a true boundary 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Occupation up to a fence without interference is not sufficient to establish 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
Both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as a boundary 
and recognition and acquiescence must be mutual. Defendant knew that the line 
was not a boundary. None of the plaintiffs had knowledge of the fence being a 
boundary, and at most supposed or mistakenly believed it to be. The fence was used 
as a barrier for cattle and was never an ownership boundary. All references in 
recorded documents are descriptions tied to section monuments with no reference to 
any fence, until the Judgment dated September 14, 2008, described the boundary 
with reference to a fence along several courses and distances. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT 
THERE WAS MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN A FENCE 
AS A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IN FINDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS BELIEVED THAT THE FENCE 
WAS A BOUNDARY WHICH INCLUDED TWO ACRES 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S DESCRIBED PROPERTY 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT SHARED THAT BELIEF. 
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The trial court's finding in Par. 6 that "the plaintiffs have always believed 
that the fence is the boundary between their property and the defendants' property" 
is supported by an affidavit of Cindy S. Hatch and the trial testimony of Mack 
Smith, who are two of the four plaintiffs. The other two plaintiffs did not testify, 
nor was there direct evidence of their beliefs. Thus if mistaken belief constitutes 
acquiescence, then only two of the four owners are on record as so believing. 
Cindy S. Hatch's affidavit is dated September 4, 2007 and supplied in 
support of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. After stating that she is a 
registered certified public accountant licensed with the state of Utah, the relevant 
portions of the affidavit are: (R-311) 
2. Since 1978,1, along with my three brother, have had an interest in 
my family's farm located in Davis County, Utah, which is referred to as the 
Smith Parcel in the above-captioned lawsuit and is more particularly 
described as follows: [a full legal description follows which shows the 
exclusion of the defendants' two acre tract of 231 feet east to west and 
379.60 feet north to south] 
3. Since at least 1978,1 have observed our family use the Smith 
Parcel for the raising of hay and for grazing of livestock. 
4. Since 1978,1 have believed that the East boundary of the Smith 
Parcel is located in the place of barbed wire fence that currently exists as 
depicted in the survey attached hereto as Exhibit 1. I know that the barbed 
wire fence has existed in its present location as depicted on the survey since 
at least 1978. 
5. Just before this lawsuit was filed, I learned that the fence does not 
strictly follow the boundary of the Smith Parcel, but instead follows a path 
that leaves some property to which Security claims to have record title. 
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6. Before obtaining the survey attached in the Exhibit 1,1 had not 
known that the legal description for the parcel of land owned by Security 
Investment Ltd. crosses the barbed wire fence along the East boundary of the 
Smith Parcel. 
7. The fence has been treated by me and our family as the boundary 
between the Smith Parcel and all of the property owner to the East, including 
Security, since at least 1978. 
8. I have never seen anyone use any of the property on our side of the 
fence other than our family. Specifically, I have never observed nor been 
told that Security or anyone affiliated with Security, has ever used any 
portion of the property on our side of the fence. In fact, our family has 
consistently, and without interruption, used all of the property on our side of 
the fence, including the area Security now claims belongs to it in the above-
captioned lawsuit. Our family's use has included improving the soil, running 
livestock, planting and cutting hay and other farm related uses. 
9. The barbed wire fence is the boundary between the Smith Parcel 
and the adjoining property owned by Security and has been since at least 
1978. 
Cindy's affidavit does not state what the other three plaintiffs believed, 
however she indicates that she and her family treated the fence as a boundary. 
The only plaintiff to testify was Mack Smith whose testimony relative to his 
belief of the boundary is the following excerpts from the transcript: 
Q Okay. What have you considered to be the boundary between your 
farm and the Security Investment parcel or the Staley parcel as it is often 
been referred to? 
A This fence. 
(TR 79). Regarding the fence: 
Q And you're saying that that [ditch] was dug after the fence was located 
in its current location? 
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A We never, ever - the fence was always there from the time we bought 
the farm and we dug the drain ditch, we moved west of it and the integrity of 
the fence was never affected by the digging of the drain ditch. 
(TR 79-80). 
Q And in your recollection does the fence run relatively straight 
considering it had (inaudible) and everything from that point south? 
A It does. 
Q And who was the owner of this parcel? 
A We owned that. It was part of the Smith Farm. 
Q Who were the owners of it? 
A At that time, at the time we bought it was W. R. Smith, my 
grandfather. 
Q Okay. And at some point in time you became aware of the Security 
Investment or Staleys owning a parcel. Would you please show for us in a 
different color, maybe orange color where you believe the Security parcels 
come into your fence line? 
A Well, this is going to sound very ridiculous but this is my recollection. 
I was at the courthouse looking up— 
Q Just over here where this Security parcel is. 
A This is their parcel hereon up. And I was in the courthouse doing 
something, I think probably looking at the right-of-way on the Gun Club 
Road and my memory told me there was two acres out here in our property 
that belonged to the Staleys. 
Q And when did you become aware of that? 
A. Pretty vague on that, maybe 15 years ago or something, I don't know. 
I couldn't imagine why John Staley as an attorney would have taken two 
acres out in the farm so when I learned recently with this dispute that it 
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attached to their property, I went over to the courthouse to see if I was crazy 
and it turns out I was. 
Q Well, during the time period that's at issue here, did you know any 
other boundary other than that blue line? 
A Never have ever known any other boundary. 
(TR81). 
If 15 years ago he was looking at the right of way or the Gun Club Road, he 
knew that "there was two acres out here in our property that belonged to Staleys," 
that would be in 1993, when he had actual knowledge of the Staley's two acres. 
The alleged twenty-year period was claimed as being form 1978 to 1998. Mack's 
belief did not continue for twenty years, only five years. 
Assuming that one's belief is synonymous with acquiescence, we consider 
the effect of a unilateral mistaken belief. 
In Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951), the Court held (quoting 
from Holmes v. Judge, 312 Utah 269): 
"We do not wish to be understood as holding that the parties may not claim 
to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary is located 
through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is clear that the line as located 
was not intended as a boundary, and where a boundary so located has not 
been acquiesced in for a long term of years by the parties in interest." 
Cindy was mistaken as to the fence being a boundary and her mistaken belief should 
not deprive the defendant who was not mistaken. 
The Brown v. Mulliner court also held that a fence erected at a time land on 
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both sides of the fence was owned by the same person the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence was inapplicable: 
In Home Owners5 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, supra, there was evidence 
that a fence line, which it was contended had long been acquiesced in as the 
boundary, had been erected at a time when the land on both sides of the fence 
was owned by the same person; in Peterson v. Johnson, it was proved that the 
fence in question had been erected when the property on one side thereof was 
part of the public domain; and in Glenn v. Whitney, supra, a fence, urged to 
be a long-recognized boundary, was shown by the evidence to have been 
erected by a person who never owned the property on either side of the fence. 
In all three of these cases this court held that the doctrine of boundary of 
acquiescence was not applicable because in view of the evidence there was 
no room for any implication that the fence line had been erected by adjoining 
owners pursuant to an agreement between them as to the location of the 
boundary between them. 
Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951). 
In Brown v. Mulliner, it was also stated that a person is presumed to claim 
title to the land called for by his deed. 
The fact that a landowner allows others to share with him the use of his land 
does not necessarily signify a disclaimer of ownership. And this is perhaps 
ever more true when, as in the instant case the location of the true boundary 
does not appear to have been known to he adjoining owners. A person 
should be presumed to claim title to all the land called for by his deed unless 
it clearly appears otherwise. 
Id. at 208. 
There do not appear to have been appellate decisions on the relationship 
between "belief and acquiescence. Even assuming the relevance of "belief," a 
determination of a person's belief is not readily provable. Should the test of 
"belief be a subjective one, or the objective test of a reasonable person under the 
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circumstances? An objective test would require a person to make substantial 
investigation or inquiry to support a belief. 
The California District Court of Appeal case of Rast v. Fischer, 236 P.2d 
393, 395 (1951) stated that: 
[1] Thus we have at the outset a situation in which there was no disputed 
boundary, but a mistake as to the true boundary by the parties concerned. As 
was said in Pedersen v. Reynolds, 31 Cal.App.2d 18, 28, 87 P.2d 51, quoting 
from 4 Thompson on Real Property, page 210, section 3115, "An agreement 
or acquiescence in a wrong boundary when the true boundary is known, or 
can be ascertained from the deed, is treated both in law and equity as a 
mistake, and neither party is estopped from claiming the true line." 
The part of the quotation "or can be ascertained from the deed" suggests that an 
examination of the deed description is at least an important element of an objective 
test as evidence of "belief." 
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252 
(Utah App. 2006) precludes a determination of boundary by acquiescence where 
only one party recognizes a fence as a boundary in stating that: 
Although acquiescence in a boundary line may occur through a party's 
silence or failure to object and does not require an explicit agreement, 
"recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must have 
knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary line." Argyle v. Jones, 
2005 UT App 346, |^ 11,118 P.3d 301 (emphasis added) (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
[12-14] f 16 In the instant matter, although the Browns subjectively 
believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually 
communicated their belief to Jorgensen, either by word or action. Therefore, 
there was no "actual acknowledgement... that the parties treat the [F]ence as 
the common boundary." Moreover, "'[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to 
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be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time 
will not establish it as the true boundary.5" Argyle, 2005 UT App 346 at Hl35 
118 P.3d 301 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 
267, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2 556, 559 
(Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiffs occupation to the fence without interference was 
not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a 
boundary."). 
Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d at 1257. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND 
CONCLUDING THAT ACQUIESCENCE WAS SHOWN 
BY THE UNILATERAL TESTIMONY AND BELIEF OF 
SOME OF THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THE FENCE 
CONSTITUTED THE BOUNDARY WHERE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTIONS OF RECORD PLAINLY DISCLOSED 
THE TWO ACRES OF THE DEFENDANTS 
PROJECTING INTO THE PLAINTIFFS' LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION. 
As quoted from Brown v. Jorgensen, "recognition and acquiescence must be 
mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] 
boundary line." Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d at 1257. 
The trial court made no finding that the defendant recognized and acquiesced 
in the fence line as a boundary, and in fact the court in its Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 11, refers to the testimony of Marvin George, who with his father, was 
leasing the defendants5 65 acres for pasturing cattle and were actually paying for 
two acres that they were not using. This testimony and finding clearly negate any 
"mutual" recognition or acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Marv George was 
subpoenaed by Plaintiffs to testify. At page 68 of the transcript, his testimony was: 
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Q Mr. George, you were leasing 65 acres. Why didn't you farm any of 
the portion of the two acres west of the fence? 
A It wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't 
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
IMPUTE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE RECORD 
DESCRIPTIONS TO NEGATE PLAINTIFFS' 
ASSERTED BELIEF THAT THE FENCE WAS THE 
BOUNDARY. 
The Plaintiffs are bound by actual notice and by constructive notice by 
statute. Utah Code Annotated § 57-4a-2 provides: 
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects. 
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any 
defect, irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or 
acknowledgment. A certified copy of a recorded document is admissible as 
evidence to the same extent the original document would be admissible as 
evidence. 
The plaintiffs' complaint sets forth the recorded legal description which 
excludes the defendants5 231 feet by 379.60 feet in Section 22. (R2) The same 
description is repeated in a deed by Plaintiffs' father and mother to "Alkali Limited" 
a partnership in which plaintiffs were partners, recorded October 20, 1978, in Book 
734, page 628, in the office of the Davis County recorded as shown by JT Exhibit 
11 admitted into evidence. 
The same description was repeated in a Quit Claim Deed made by Alkali 
Limited by its partners, William R. Smith, Mack G. Smith, John Lynn Smith and 
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Cindy Smith Hatch to BMJC, L.L.C. recorded May 4, 1999 as shown by JT Exhibit 
12. 
There was a subsequent conveyance by BMJC to the four trusts of the 
plaintiffs with an identical description dated June 7, 2001. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Universal CI. T. Corporation v. 
Courtesy Motors, 8 Utah 2d 275 (Utah 1959), stated first that "it is not claimed that 
under the Colorado statutes this recordation was effective for giving constructive 
notice," and then held: 
As stated by this court in McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 
188, at page 293 in requoting with approval from Wood v. Carpenter, 101 
U.S. 135 at page 141, 25 L.Ed. 807: 
"'Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall 
be deemed conversant of it.'" 
Id. at 278. 
Accordingly, the actual notice of content of the deeds, and constructive 
notice, should eliminate the plaintiffs' belief claims and should constitute 
knowledge which controverts the claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
Failure to read the content of a contract is no defense and the came principle 
should apply in failure to read the deed descriptions. In the case of Garff Realty Co. 
v. Better Buildings, 234 P.2d 842 (Utah 1951), the Supreme Court quoted from 12 
Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 137: 
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The governing rule is thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., contracts, sec. 137, pp. 628-
29: Ignorance of the contents of an instrument does not ordinarily affect the 
liability of one who signs it. * * * If a man acts negligently and in such a way 
as to justify others in supposing that the writing is assented to by him he will 
be bound both at law and in equity, even though he supposes the writing is an 
instrument of an entirely different character. The courts appear to be 
unanimous in holding that a person who, having the capacity and an 
opportunity to read a contract, is not misled as to its contents and who 
sustains no confidential relationship to the other part cannot avoid the 
contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it without reading it, at least in 
the absence of special circumstances excusing his failure to read it. If the 
contract is plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound thereby. 
* * * To permit a party, when sued on a written contract, to admit that he 
signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him 
to admit that he signed it but did not read it or know its stipulations would 
absolutely destroy the value of all contracts. The purpose of the rule is to 
give stability to written agreements and to remove the temptation and 
possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if parol evidence were 
admissible. 
Garff Realty Co., 234 P.2d at 844. Also, Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, Section 225 
is to the same effect. 
POINT IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OMITTING FINDINGS 
BASED UPON RECORD TITLES SHOWN BY 
EXHIBITS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE. 
The trial court made no findings based upon record titles as contained in 
Exhibits admitted in evidence. These exhibits of recorded documents are attached 
in the addendum and can be determined by this Court to show that the fence was 
never erected as a boundary. The exhibits in the addendum were admitted by 
stipulation. (Tr. 107). 
Exhibit JT 17 is a patent from the united States to Heber C. Wood in 1883, 
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which describes the South half of the South East Quarter of the South Section 
twenty-two containing 80 acres. The two acres of the defendant, Security, and the 
Smith property in dispute are within said 80 acres. 
This patent was followed by a deed (Exhibit JT 18) in 1883 from Heber C. 
Wood to Jacob Gierisch, conveying the 80 acre tract "except four acres lying and 
situate in the Southeast corner of the said South half of the South East Quarter of 
Section No. 22, T 2 R 1 W." The south two acres of said four acres now are owned 
of record by the plaintiffs and the north two acres are owned of record by the 
defendant. Accordingly as of 1883, a fence along the section line between Sections 
23 on the east and Section 22 on the west was no longer a boundary of the four 
acres. 
In 1901, Heber C. Wood deeded the four acres to Jacob Gierisch as shown by 
Exhibit JT 19. 
In 1913, Jacob Gierisch, by Warranty Deed (Exhibit JT 20) deeded in 
separate descriptions the four acre tract and the 76 acre tract to Ancel Hatch. 
Ancel Hatch in 1945 executed a Sale Agreement (Exhibit JT 22) with 
William Guffy for several parcels, one of which is the two acre parcel of the four 
acre parcel now owned of record by Plainitiffs. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, paragraph 2 (R 360), stated: "There has 
been a barbed wire fence on the east side of plaintiffs' land since at least 1964. In 
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fact it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence is in the same location 
that it has been since 1949." 
Mack Smith, one of the plaintiffs and the only plaintiff to testify at trial, 
recalled that in 1949 or 1950, an old fence was in existence. On direct examination, 
Mack Smith testified as follows: (Tr 78-79). 
Q Now you've identified a fence. Is the fence that you're talking about 
in the same location as the fence that's there today? 
A It is. 
Q And approximately what time was this? 
A It would have been in '49 or '50, right after we bought it. We 
gathered up the old wood fence. 
Q And when you were gathering up the old wood fence, was there a 
fence already there, is that what you just said? 
A It was a very crude, barbed wire fence. They used tree limbs for fence 
posts, etc. but it was there. 
Q So I imagine that you observed that fence be repaired or participated; 
is that correct? 
A I have. 
Q And would you describe that for us? How have you participated in 
repairing that fence. 
A Just the general fence repair, you go along and check the posts and 
staple and if there's wire missing you replace it and... 
Q In connection with that have you ever seen the fence move any more 
than just a few - 1 mean, can you describe for us whether it's been moved? 
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A It's where it's always been. 
The trial court's conclusion that the fence was to serve as a boundary and a 
second purpose to serve as a barrier to keep cattle on the property is not consistent 
with the testimony that an old fence in 1949 was reconstructed which was described 
as a very crude, barbed wire fence using tree limbs for fence posts, and the fence is 
in the same location that the one is today. That old fence was never a boundary to 
the four acres which were separated off from the 80 acres starting in 1893, and was 
never a boundairy to the two acres of the defendant, nor the two acres of the plaintiff 
of that four acres in several conveyances after 1893 and subsequent conveyances 
described in JT Exhibits 11 through 27. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT, 
The trial court concluded there was mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, however, only one plaintiff, Mack, testified concerning his belief that the 
fence was a boundary, although in 1993 he had seen the plat at the recorder's office 
and said "my memory told me there was two acres out here in our property that 
belonged to the Staleys." R82. 
Cindy S. Hatch's affidavit stated she believed the fence was the boundary in 
that she had never seen anyone other than her family using the property west of the 
fence line. JT Exhibit 14 are photocopies of photos depicting the fence line area 
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which is overgrown with trees and vegetation unrelated to farming or occupation up 
to the fence which is obscured by the growth. 
Scott Smith, a son of the plaintiff, William R. Smith, testified that he took 
over running the Smith Farm in 1986. (Tr 24). Scott testified that there was a 
drainage ditch west of the fence and an irrigation ditch about 50 feet west of the 
fence which was used to irrigate the pasture, although the cattle grazed the area 
between the fence and the irrigation ditch. (Tr 51). 
Cindy Hatch could not have observed anyone occupying the land between the 
irrigation ditch and the fence line and her affidavit states that since 1978 she 
observed her family use the Smith parcel for raising of hay and for grazing of 
livestock (Tr 167) and that the family's use included improving the soil, running 
livestock, planting and cutting hay and other farm related uses (Tr 168). It appears 
that the 50 feet east of the irrigation ditch could only be used by cattle assuming that 
the cattle were attracted to the overgrown area 59 feet west of the fence and is the 
only evidence of "occupation up to a visible line." 
There was no evidence of any acquiescence by the defendant in the fence as a 
boundary. 
The trial court, in paragraph 11 of the findings, recognized the testimony of 
Marvin George in 1965 while he and his father were working on the fence there was 
a discussion with one of the plaintiffs' predecessors where "the substance of the 
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conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants' property, 
were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the parcel)." The 
court also stated in that paragraph 11 that there was no testimony given that the 
plaintiffs knew of this conversation, and there was no testimony given that the 
plaintiffs knew after 1978 that the parcel was actually the defendants5 property (R 
362). Marvin George also testified as to why he didn't farm the two acres: (Tr 68) 
Q Mr. George, you were leasing 65 acres. Why didn't you farm any of 
the portion of the two acres west of the fence? 
A It wasn't economically feasible for us to go fence it. Our lease wasn't 
enough to make it worth fencing two acres off. We didn't need the pasture. 
This Court has held in the case of Argyle v. Jones, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah App. 
2005): 
The narrow issue presented is whether the failure of the Joneses to object to 
the forty-year occupation of the disputed property by Roger Argyle and his 
predecessors is sufficient to establish acquiescence. Whether a landowner's 
inaction alone is sufficient to establish acquiescence was discussed in Glen v. 
Whiney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949). In Glen, the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically held that "[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to be put up 
and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time will not 
establish it as the true boundary." 209 P.2d at 260; see also Hales v. Frakes, 
600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiff s occupation to the fence without 
interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the 
fence as a boundary."). 
Argyle, 188 P.3d at 305 (footnote omitted). Assuming that the belief of some of the 
plaintiffs constituted acquiescence, there was no evidence of any acquiescence by 
the defendant, thus, no mutual acquiescence. 
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The Court in Argyle also footnoted: 
4. Because this case involves a review of the district court's legal 
conclusions only, this court gives deference to the district court's factual 
findings. Accordingly, this analysis assumes that Sterling Jones neither 
informed Charles Argyle of the true ownership status of the disputed property 
nor granted the Argyles permission to use the property. 
Id., footnote 4. Accordingly, there was no need for the defendant to inform plaintiffs 
of the conversation in 1965 relative to ownership of the two acres nor as to 
continuing the use of the two acres by the plaintiffs. 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS PRETRIAL 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ADJUDICATION THAT 
SILENCE ALONE IS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE 
ACQUIESCENCE IF THE DEFENDANT ALSO TREATED 
THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY INSTEAD OF A BARRIER 
AND LIMITING THE ISSUE FOR TRIAL AS BEING 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT TREATED THE FENCE AS A 
BOUNDARY OR AS A BARRIER UNDER UTAH'S 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
This Court in Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252 (Utah App. 2006) ruled on 
issues of silence, failure to object and knowledge of the existing line as a boundary: 
[11] f 15 Various landowner activities may provide evidence of 
acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary, such as "[occupation up to, but 
never over, the line," or "silence, or the failure of a party to object to a line as 
a boundary." Id. at \ 25. Although acquiescence in a boundary line may 
occur through a party's silence or failure to object and does not require an 
explicit agreement, "recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both 
parties must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary 
line." Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App 346,-
f 11, 118 P.3d 301 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
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[12-14] T| 16 In the instant matter, although the Browns subjectively 
believed that the Fence was the property line, they never actually 
communicated their belief to Jorgensen, either by word or action. Therefore, 
there was no "actual acknowledgement... that the parties treat the [F]ence as 
the common boundary." Moreover, "'[t]he mere fact that a fence happens to 
be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time 
will not establish it as the true boundary.5" Argyle, 2005 UT App 346 at f 13, 
118 P.3cl 301 (alteration in original) (quoting Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 
267, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (1949)); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 
(Utah 1979) ("[P]laintiff s occupation to the fence without interference was 
not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a 
boundary."). 
Id. at 1257. 
There was no evidence that the defendants recognized or treated the fence as 
a boundary. There was evidence that the defendant had knowledge that the fence 
was not the boundary. The evidence was that the defendant maintained the fence to 
retain cattle and horses and that the plaintiffs and predecessors maintained the fence 
for the same reason. 
In the Brown case, this Court also considered the purpose of the fence: 
U 17 Additionally, "[f]rom the initial recognition of boundary by 
acquiescence in Utah, courts have recognized the importance of the purpose 
of a fence.' Id. at f^ 10. In this matter, the trial court found that Jorgensen's 
predecessors "ran livestock on the land" and that the Browns and their 
predecessors also "Used [their] property to graze cattle and sheep," among 
other uses. 
Brown, 136 P.3d at 1257-58. The fence having been erected before conveyances 
separated the four acre tract (and the two acre tracts within) and was never erected 
as a boundary between the plaintiffs' property and the defendants' property. Nor 
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was it a boundary between their respective predecessors, but was erected at a time 
when the properties had a common ownership. The continued use and purpose of 
the fence was to contain livestock. 
This Court in Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 
(Utah App. 1999), after stating that courts have recognized the importance of the 
purpose of a fence, also held that mere acquiescence in use without more is 
insufficient to establish boundary by acquiescence. See id. at 232, footnote 3. 
In the instant case, Smith's have only proved an acquiescence in use. 
POINT VII. ASSUMING THAT A DETERMINING FACTOR IN 
ACQUIESCENCE IS THE TREATMENT OF THE FENCE AS 
A BOUNDARY AND NOT AS A BARRIER, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE FENCE 
WAS TREATED AS A BOUNDARY. 
The use of the fence did not change prior to 1949 until the time of trial in 
2008, during which time it was maintained to contain cattle. The fence was not 
needed for any of the other farming operations such as raising hay. 
Scott Smith, son of the plaintiff, William R. Smith, testified that he was born 
on the farm in 1964 and worked on the farm until age 19, then returned to the farm 
m 19S5 to take over tumvmg the farm performing such duties as cuttmg hay, balmg 
hay, moving cows and fence. (Tr 24). Scott said that a drain ditch about two feet 
from the fence, having dimensions of about eight feet across the top and four or five 
feet at the bottom was put in initially to contain run off waters so you can farm and 
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it also provides drinking water for the cattle. (Tr 28). Scott's recollection of 
farming dates from the time he was five or six years old, and the fence and drain 
have been in the same place since that time (1970). 
Regarding repairs to the fence, Scott testified: (Tr 29) 
Q Describe for us what kind of repairs you had to make. 
A Well, we try to maintain fences so walk them, you staple wires where 
you need. When wire becomes too old, you replace it. We've never replaced 
any of the wire on that side of the fence but we have stapled it and we have, 
you know, walked it and, you know, maintained to keep our cattle on our side 
of the fence. 
In 1978, the year which the plaintiffs contend began the acquiescence in the 
fence as a boundary, Scott was 14 years old. We quote from his testimony in the 
transcript from pages 40 to 44. 
Q And in 1978, how old would you be? 
A Fourteen, is that right. Fourteen? Yeah, 14. 
Q At that time part of the Smith Farm extended also into Section 23, 40 
acres here, didn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q And that went to Verl? 
A Yes. 
Q But before it went to Verl, it was part of the Smith Farm, wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q So that this fence that goes from the section corner on north, was 
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actually fenced between Smith's Farm 40 acres and the balance of the Smith 
Farm; is that right? 
A Now state that again. 
Q The fence that comes from the section comer and comes south over to 
the Staley property, that property that was east was all part of Smith's 
property, wasn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q And there was a fence that divided the east part of Smith's property 
and the west part, didn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q Why was this fence maintained? 
A To keep the livestock in that we would put on the east side there that 
we pastured and so forth and back here to the back it was to keep the, so we 
could green shop the - when we farmed that 40 acres, so we could green 
shop that and the cows would have to stay behind the milk bam and so forth 
where we would let them out during the day to get them off of the concrete. 
Q So that's why you used that fence? 
A Yes. 
Q And then there's a short distance of 379 feet that that fence continues 
past the Smith -excuse me, the Security property, isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
Q Security's property goes clear over to the beginning of this A-2 drain, 
doesn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q So that the only part[] of the Staley's property that is fenced that you 
were utilizing were the 379 feet? 
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A Yes. 
Q Do you know who built that fence along the Staley property? 
A I do not. 
Q Does it look like the same fence all the way? 
A No. 
Q- Where did it change? 
A Ummm, it changes - well, the fence as been changed, you know - this 
fence no longer exists and I put this fence back in new a couple of years ago. 
Q No, you said this fence starting from the corner -
A The corner is out here. 
Q - over about 290 feet no longer exists, you say? 
A Right. 
Q But from (inaudible) feet on, that same fence exists? 
A I replaced that fence. 
Q When did you replace it? 
A 19 - shoot - 1991 maybe, give or take a couple of years in there. 
Q All right. Show me what portion of the fence you replaced. 
A I replaced from here to here. 
Q You're pointing from 290 feet from the corner over to -
A I have fence that goes east and west at that point. 
Q So you replaced that in 1991 ? 
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A Roughly. 
Q In the same place? 
A Yes. 
Q And why did you replace it? 
A Why did I replace it? Because I was feeding cattle here in the winter 
and I needed a solid fence to keep them where they belonged. 
Q Did you at any time replace the fence across the 379 feet of the Staley 
property? 
A No, I have not. 
Q Who maintained that fence? 
A I've maintained it. The George's have maintained it. Last year a guy 
by the name of Jeremiah Kingston put new wire on that fence. 
Q Why did he do that? 
A Why? Because he put cattle in there and they kept getting over in my 
hay field. 
It appears from the testimony of Scott Smith, the person who was on the 
premises from 1985 to the time of trial, that the purpose of the fence was to contain 
cattle. It would not be needed for haying or other farm purposes. The fence other 
than along the 379 feet boundary of Security Investment (Stahle) was repaired and 
maintained by Scott to contain cattle, and the 379 feet along the Stahle property was 
repaired by "Georges" the tenant of Security Investment to contain livestock. 
There was no evidence that the fence was ever built to mark a boundary, nor 
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thereafter maintained to mark the boundary of property described in conveyances 
occurring after 1983. All of the evidence was that the fence was used as a barrier to 
contain cattle. There was no evidence that the Fence was evidence of ownership 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding boundary by acquiescence based upon belief 
of some of the plaintiffs that the fence was the boundary as claimed by an affidavit 
of Cindy S. Hatch. The only plaintiff to testify, Mack Smith, acknowledged that he 
learned of the two acre parcel of Stahle (Security) in 1993, before the expiration of 
the 20 year term in 1998, thus having actual knowledge of the legal boundaries. The 
uncontroverted evidence was that the fence was used only as a barrier to contain 
cattle. There was no evidence that the defendant ever recognized the fence as a 
boundary and in fact the plaintiffs' own witness, Marv George testified that from 
1965 to date of trial he and his family leased 65 acres from the defendant, and did 
not fence the west two acres because they didn't need the extra pasture and it was 
not worth fencing. 
The cause should be remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment 
dismissing the complaint and restoring of record the boundary description existing 
prior to the judgment of September 4, 2008. 
Dated this a_ day of December, 2008, 
Respectfully submitted, 
'George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Certificate of Service 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. JUDGMENT. 
3. Portion of JT Exhibit 3 of the Davis County 
Recorder's Plat of all of section 22,T 2 N R 1 W. 
4. STIPULATION CONCERNING TRIAL EXHIBITS ( 4 pages). 
5. JT Exhibit 11, Warranty Deed, from William Howard 
Smith et ux. (parents of plaintiffs) to ALKALI LIMITED, 1978, 
describing plaintiffs1 tract as set forth in complaint. 
6. JT Exhibit 12, Quit Claim deed by ALKALI LIMITED 
to the four plaintiffs as partners of ALKALI LIMITED to BMJC, 
L.L.C. wherein plaintiffs are members, 1999. 
7. JT Exhibit 13, Quit Claim Deed by SECURITY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, to SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD,defendant. 
The second description of 14.90 acres includes defendant's two 
acre tract in Section 22, and 12.90 acres in Section 23.(1997) 
8.JT Exhibit, photo copies picturing area of the 
subject fenceline. JT Exhibit 14 color copies reproduced by App. 
9. JT Exhibit 16, DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AGREEMENT, 
by heirs of plaintiffs' grandparents dividing the extended farm 
property among four children, one of whom, William Howard Smith, 
is the father of plaintiffs who receives the tract described in 
the complaint. 
10. JT Exhibit 17, USA PATENT TO HEBER C. WOOD, dated 
2-12-1883, which describes the South Half of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 22, 80 acres which includes Plaintiffs1 
entire tract as well as defendant's two acre tract. 
11. JT Exhibit 18, a deed by HEBER C. WOOD to 
JACOB GIERISCH describing the same 8 0 acre tract of JT Exhibit 
17, dated 2-13-1883, excepting however " FOUR ACRES LYING AND 
SITUATE IN THE NORTH EAST CORNER OF THE SAID SOUTH HALF OF THE 
SOUTH EAST QUARTER OF SECTION NO. 22, T 2 N R 1 vV, of which 
the north two acres becomes that of the defendant, and the 
1 
south two acres became the property of the plaintiffs as a 
part of the property described in the complaint. 
12. JT Exhibit 19, a deed by HEBER C. WOOD on 
December 14, 1901, to JACOB GIERIbCH of tne four acre tract 
described in JT Exhibit 18. 
13. JT Exhibit 20, a Warranty Deed, May 1, 1913, 
by JACOB GIERISCH to ANCEL HATCH which excludes the four acres 
tram the 80 acres tract described in Exhibit 18. 
14. JT Exhibit 21, a Warranty Deed by ALVIN and 
ELIZABETH HATCH to ANCEL HATCH in 1940, at the bottom of tne 
page describes the south two acres belonging to nhe plaintiffs. 
15. JT Exhibit 22, a SALE AGREEMENT dated Feb.12,1948, 
by ANCEL HATCH et ux. , as Sellers to WILLIAM GUFFEY, et ux., 
describing several parcels, one of which , the second from the 
DOttom,of the page, describes the plaintiffs' two acres. The 
plaintiffs1 grandfather , WILLIAM R. SMITH , received an assign-
ment of the said SALE AGRniEM^NT. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A. 
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH 
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK G. 
SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH as Trustees 
of THE MACK G. AND CAROLYN SMITH 
REVOCABLE TRUST; J. LYNN SMITH, as 
Trustee of THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING 
TRUST; and CINDY S. HATCH, an 
individual, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from Bench 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM 




SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah 
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 060700147 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 20, 2006. In that complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged that they and the defendants were neighbors, and that their properties had been separated 
by a barbed wire fence for at least fifty years. The plaintiffs' property is west of the defendants' 
property, and so the fence is on the east side of the plaintiffs' property. 
The plaintiffs discovered that the fence was not the actual property boundary. A portion 
of the defendants' property ("the Parcel"), which was approximately two acres in size, was on the 
west side of the fence (on the plaintiffs' side). Because the plaintiffs had used the property for a 
lengthy period of time, they sought to resolve the dispute by asking the defendants to sign a 
2 boundary agreement which would show that the Parcel belonged to the plaintiffs. The defendants 
* refused to sign the boundary agreement, and the parties commenced this litigation. 
9 The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2007. The litigation 
a 
tH
 of that motion lasted for almost six months. On March 21, 2008, the Court issued a ruling in 
3 
$ which it denied the motion for summary judgment. The Court held that the second element of the 
test for boundary by acquiescence had not been clearly satisfied, and so summary judgment 
would be improper. The Court did hold that the other three elements were satisfied, and so the 
only remaining issue for trial was whether the second requirement was satisfied. 
The Court conducted a bench trial on this matter on June 5, 2008. The Court now issues 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence presented at that trial. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiffs and the defendants are neighbors. The plaintiffs' property is located 
west of the defendants' property. 
2. There has been a barbed wire fence on the east side of the plaintiffs' land since at 
least 1964. In fact, it appears from the testimony given at trial that the fence is in 
the same location that it has been since 1949. 
3. That fence is the boundary between the plaintiffs' property and a number of other 
properties owned by different individuals. The fence follows a straight, or nearly 
straight, course. The fence follows the record boundaries, with one exception. In 
one portion of the fence line, the fence line does not follow the record boundary. 
Instead, the fence continues in a straight line and cuts off a two-acre parcel that is 
recorded as belonging to the defendants. That parcel ("the Parcel") is the basis of 
Page 2 of 8 
the dispute between the parties. 
Both parties helped maintain the fence. 
The plaintiffs' property was passed down through inheritance to the current 
owners. The plaintiffs took possession of the property in 1978. All of the plaintiffs 
and their predecessors used the Parcel for farming and grazing. The plaintiffs were 
never told not to use the Parcel, and the plaintiffs were never informed that the 
Parcel belonged to the defendants. The defendants have not used the Parcel for 
any purpose, and individuals who leased the defendants' property likewise did not 
use the Parcel for any purpose. 
The plaintiffs have always believed that the fence is the boundary between their 
property and the defendants' property. 
Both parties have grazed cattle on their respective properties. 
There are two ditches that follow different portions of the fence. All ditches are 
located on the west side of the fence, and are thus on the plaintiffs' side of the 
fence. 
The ditch that follows the portion of the fence that borders the Parcel is the Smith 
drain. There were some allegations during the litigation of the motion for 
summary judgment that the fence might have served as a barrier to livestock, and 
that the fence kept the cattle out of the drain ditch. However, the fence is only on 
one side of the ditch. As noted above, both parties ran cattle on their respective 
properties. Thus, the fence did keep the defendants' cattle out of the Smith drain, 
but there was no fence to keep the plaintiffs' cattle out of the Smith drain. In fact, 
Scott Smith testified that the plaintiffs use the Smith drain to help water their 
cattle. Thus, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was 
required to keep cattle from entering the ditch. 
,H 10. Mack Smith is the grandson of William R. Smith, who purchased the property that 
K now belongs to the plaintiffs. Mack Smith testified that the Smith drain was dug 
- after the fence was constructed, and the digging of the drain had no effect on the 
w 
3 location of the fence. 
11. Marvin George testified that in approximately 1965> he, his father, and another 
« gentleman were working on the fence, and had a discussion with one of the 
plaintiffs' predecessors. Marvin George testified that the substance of the 
conversation was that he and his father, who were leasing the defendants' 
property, were actually paying to lease two acres that they were not using (the 
Parcel). There was no testimony given that showed that any of the plaintiffs knew 
of this conversation, and there was no testimony given that the plaintiffs knew 
after 1978 that the Parcel was actually the defendants' property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There are four requirements that must be met before this Court can establish a 
boundary by acquiescence. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1998). 
There must be "(0 occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, 
or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long 
period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Id. (internal citation omitted). 
2. The Court previously denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, 
because it was not clear whether the fence in question had been built to serve as a 
barrier or whether it was intended as a boundary. Thus, the second requirement for 
boundary by acquiescence had not been satisfied. However, the Court did find that 
the first and fourth requirements had been satisfied. The Court also found that the 
third element was satisfied, but only if the second element was also satisfied. 
Thus, the only remaining issue to be determined at trial was whether the purpose 
of the fence was to be a barrier instead of a boundary. 
The plaintiffs' property was transferred to them in 1978, and this is the year that 
began the twenty-year period that is required in order to establish a claim for 
boundary by acquiescence. There has been no evidence presented to show that the 
plaintiffs knew that the fence was not the record boundary. In fact, all of the 
plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they believed that the fence was the actual 
boundary between their property and the defendants' property. 
The conversation described by Marvin George occurred in 1965, and none of the 
plaintiffs witnessed that conversation. Therefore, the conversation is outside of the 
relevant time frame, and because none of the plaintiffs knew of the content of the 
conversation, the plaintiffs are not estopped from claiming that they believed that 
the fence was the proper boundary between their property and the defendants' 
property. 
The issue in this case is whether the fence served as a boundary, or whether it was 
intended solely as a barrier. Of course, fences that serve as boundaries are also 
often de facto barriers. All fences are barriers of some type. However, the key 
consideration is whether the purpose of the fence was to keep cattle from moving 
from one location to another, or whether the primary purpose of the fence was to 
act as the boundary (and as a secondary purpose also keep cattle in the correct 
property). In the case of Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, there was also 
a fence between two properties. 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In that 
case, the Court of Appeals held that the fence was a barrier, rather than a 
boundary. Id. The Court of Appeals noted in that case that it was impractical to 
w put a fence along the true boundary, because the defendants' property contained 
w 
w 
| cliffs and gullies. Id. There was no such impracticality in this case. It would have 
- been very easy for the defendants' or plaintiffs' predecessors to build a fence on 
3 the record boundary, but that was not done. 
| 5. The Court finds that the primary purpose of this fence was to serve as a boundary. 
4 That finding is supported by several facts described above. First, the fence was 
built before the Smith drain was constructed. Thus, the purpose of the fence was 
to mark the boundary (with a secondary purpose to serve as a barrier to keep cattle 
on the appropriate property), rather than to keep cattle out of the Smith drain. 
Second, the Smith drain is not the type of ditch for which a fence was necessary to 
keep cattle out. In fact, the plaintiffs used the ditch to help water their cattle. 
Third, the fence followed a straight line, and was the proper boundary between the 
plaintiffs' property and properties of various other individuals. The Court finds 
that the parties' predecessors simply continued following that straight line when 
constructing the fence, likely believing that the property boundaries followed that 
same straight line. 
6. Because the Court finds that the fence served as a boundary, and not merely as a 
barrier, all of the elements of the test for boundary by acquiescence have been 
satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they sought in their complaint. 
The Court grants the plaintiffs' request for a judgment that the legal boundary between the 
plaintiffs' land and the defendants' land is the barbed wire fence. The Court also orders that the 
defendants have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in the property described in this ruling as 
the Parcel. 
The Court directs counsel for the plaintiffs to prepare the judgment for the Court's 
signature. 
Date signed:_ $'4't>?. 
- ^ ^ O N D ^ A ^ DISTRICT COItfRT JUDG 
/\<&' " N ^ M C H A E L G. MXPHIN 
OF \tf>£ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 




§ CONCLUSIONS OF LAW postage pre-paid, to the following on this 
if* 
<9 date: AtU).V.20Qo 
George K. Fadel 
g Fadel Associates 
I 170 West 400 South 
§ Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Wade R. Budge 
Troy L. Booher 
Snell and Wilmer, LLP 
15 West South Temple 
Suite 1200 
Gateway Tower West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Cnik^ 
Wade R. Budge (8482) 
Troy Booher (9419) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Beneficial Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A. 
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH 
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK 
G. SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH, as 
Trustees of THE MACK G. AND 
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE 
TRUST; J. LYNN SMITH as Trustee of 
THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING TRUST; 
and CINDY S. HATCH, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah 
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER, JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE QUIETING TITLE TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. 060700147 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
i PI. 
VD24507153 pages: 3 
060700147 SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from Bench Trial 
Conducted on June 5,2008, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
o n n 11 A i 
% 1. Plaintiffs' are the owners of the parcel of land described below (the "Property") 
f 
,; and assigned parcel number 06-030-0010 by the Davis County Recorder: 
o 
$ A parcel of land located in Davis County, Utah, more particularly 
£ described as: 
Beginning at the East Quarter Corner Section 22, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base And Meridian, and running thence South 
00°05'015" West 1318.01 feet; thence East 2.08 feet to a point on an 
existing wire fence; thence along said wire fence the following four (4) 
calls: South 00°14'57" East 66.25 feet; South 01°08'27" West 147.06 
feet; South 01°13'17" East 164.46 feet; South 02°49'13" West 1.90 feet; 
thence West 3.44 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 617.00 feet; thence 
South 89°53'20" West 150.01 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 290.40 
feet; thence South 89°53'20" West 1743.53 feet; thence North 00°02'17" 
East 2606.98 feet; thence North 89°56'55" East 1895.79 feet to the point 
of beginning; 
Subject to the interest of the Utah Department of Transportation obtained 
from Plaintiffs in Case No. 010700258, Second Judicial District Court. 
2. Defendant Security Investment Ltd., a Utah limited partnership, owns a parcel of 
land that adjoins the Property and is located to the east of the Property and has been assigned 
parcel number 06-030-0012 by the Davis County Recorder. The easterly boundary of the 
Property and the westerly boundary of the parcel of land owned by Security Investment Ltd., is 
on a the boundary line described as follows: 
Beginning at the East Quarter Corner Section 22, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base And Meridian, and running thence South 
00°05'015" West 1318.01 feet; thence East 2.08 feet to a point on an 
existing wire fence; thence along said wire fence the following four (4) 
calls: South 00°14'57" East 66.25 feet; South 01°08'27" West 147.06 
feet; South 01°13'17" East 164.46 feet; South 02°49'13" West 1.90 feet; 
thence West 3.44 feet; thence South 00°05'15" West 617.00 feet along the 
Westerly line of said section. 
9022114? 1 
3. Plaintiffs' title to the Property is quieted against Defendant Security Investment 
Ltd., and all those claiming by or through Defendant Security Investment Ltd., and its 
predecessors, including all persons claiming any rights, title, estate, or interest in the Property 
adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership, or clouding its title thereto. 
4. Each of the parties to this action must bear their own court costs and attorney fees 
incurred in this action. 
ENTERED this ^j_ day of r S^A 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
G & ^ . George Fadel, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CL 
Honorable Michadtt G. Allp^ 
Second Judicial District Co 
QO?? 114? 1 
ALL SECTION 22 T 2N R IW SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH - RECORDERS OFFICE 
Wade R. Budge (8482) 
Troy L. Booher (9419) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Beneficial Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -1004 
Telephone: (801)257-1900 
Facsimile: (801)257-1800 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. SMITH and LUDEAN A. 
SMITH, as Trustees of THE SMITH 
FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; MACK 
G. SMITH and CAROLYN SMITH, as 
Trustees of THE MACK G. AND 
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE 
TRUST, as Trustee of THE J. LYNN 
SMITH LIVING TRUST; and CINDY S. 
HATCH, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah 
limited partnership, and DOES 1-10, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs THE SMITH FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; THE MACK G. AND 
CAROLYN SMITH REVOCABLE TRUST; THE J. LYNN SMITH LIVING TRUST; and 
STIPULATION CONCERNING 
TRIAL EXHIBITS 
Case No. 060700147 
Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
8809786 1 
Cindy S. Hatch (collectively the "Plaintiffs"), and defendant SECURITY INVESTMENT 
LTD, by and through their attorneys, hereby stipulate to eh admissibility and authenticity of 

















Larsen & Malmquist Inc. Survey 
1 Davis County Plat map covering Section 23, Township 
2 North, Range 1 West 
1 Davis County Plat map covering Section 22, Township 
2 North,, Range 1 West 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
USDA Aerial Survey 
Warranty Deed by William Howard Smith and Lois G. 1 
Smith to Alkali Limited which was recorded 10/20/78 
Quit Claim Deed by William R. Smith, Mack G. Smith, 
John Lynn Smith and Cindy Smith, being all partners of 
Alkali Limited to BMJC, LLC, recorded 5/4/99 
Quitclaim Deed, Security Investment Company, a Utah 1 
corporation to Security Investment Ltd., a Utah limited 






























1 Photographs of the subject fence and property 
surrounding the subject fence 
Two Davis County photo maps of the subject area in 
J 1982. 
J A "Deed of Conveyance and Agreement" recorded 3-8-
73 among William Howard Smith, et ux., Verl Reed 
Smith, et ux., Joyce Smith Goodfellow and Jean Smith 
Sanders, recorded in Book 511, at page 74, in the office 
of the Davis County Recorder 
1 Patent from United States to Heber C Wood recorded 
on Book G, Page 859, Davis County Recorder. 
Indenture of Heber C Wood to Jacob Gierisch, dated 
December 13, 1877, recorded in Book G, Page 860, 
Davis County Recorder 
Indenture of HEBER C. WOOD to Jacob Gierisch, 
1901, recorded in Book R Page 508. 
Deed from Jacob Gierisch to Ancel Hatch dated 
Book 1-R Page 331, where Alvin Hatch conveys to 
Ancel Hatch. 
Book O Page 428, Sale Agreement by Ancel and Amy 
Hatch to William Guffey et ux.. 
Assignment of the Sale Agreement by Guffey to 
William R. Smith and Ella Howard Smith, joint tenants, 
recorded in Book 1, Page 343. 
Decree in the estate of Ancel Hatch settling the contract 1 
sale to Smihts, Book 96 at Page 28 ff. 
Administrators Deed to Smith, Book 96, Page 32. 1 
A Decree in judgment referencing a deed from Mamie 
E. Winegar to John & Lena V. Winegar, recorded in 
Book 1 -L of Deeds Page 277. 
Warranty Deed by Lena V. Winegar, widow, to 1 
Security Investment Company, dated April 10, 1951, 
recorded April 27,1951, in Book 25 of Records at page 
204. 1 
8809786 1 3 
1 JT28. Warranty Deed, by William Howard Smith and Lois G. 
Smith to William Howard Smith dated 5-2-73, recorded 
5-3-73 in Book 515 Page 260. 
The parties stipulate that if any of the foregoing exhibits is referred to or offered, it 
shall be admitted into evidence, provided, however, that the parties reserve the right to object 
at trial to any of the foregoing exhibits on the basis of Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Nothing in this stipulation shall prevent any party from seeking to use other 
exhibits at trial. 
DATED this ^ day of June, 2008. 
h 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Wafoe R. Budge 
Troy L. Booher 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 




Attorneys for Defendant 
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Recorded at Requesl §%8 2,j.Mu*stf J^.J*, OCT 2 0 1978 
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511887 WARRANTY DEED 
William Howard Smith and Lois G. Smith 
of Bount i fu l , County of Davis 
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to A l k a l i Limited 
grantor s 
, State of Utah, hereby 
of Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, 
Ten and no/100 ($10.00) 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
See a t tached E x h i b i t "A" 
Davis 
grantee 


























JT EXHIBIT 11 
WITNESS, the hand s of said grantor s , this 9** 
<g?CAf£^ .A.D.19 78 . 
day of 
Signed in the Presence of &£-» 
~77 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On the day of 
&£^£sAs A
 D . 19 78 , 
personally appeared before me 
the signer s of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
samp.. •* l " ' ' e
My commission expires! 
Nqjar 
7 ^ ^ ^ Residing \x\^A^^LA^^^C^ 
ot y Public. ' 
~r~ _ BLANK #1<J1 ^ - W A R R A N T Y Oeeo—< © GEM PTG CO — szis so 2eoo EAST — »AI_T LAKE C 
n 
/c- P *r r<*c 
EXHIBIT !,A 
Beginning at a point North 0°05!15M East 323.40 feet along 
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22, 
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
running thence North 0 05'15H East 617.0 feet along the 
East line of said Section; thence West 231.0 feet; thence 
North 0°05!15M East 379.60 feet parallel to the East Section 
line; thence East 231.0 feet; thence North 0°05T15n East 
1318.01 feet, more or less, to the East Quarter corner of 
said Section 22; thence South 89°56'55M West 1895.78 feet 
along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said sec-
tion to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56'55n East from the 
center of said section; thence South 0°02!17M West 2606.98 
feet parallel to the West line of said Southeast Quarter 
to a point 33.0 feet North of the South line of said Sec-
tion; thence North 89°53t20n East 1743.53 feet, parallel 
to and 33.0 feet North of the South line of said section 
to a point 150.0 feet West of the East line of said section; 
thence North 0°05!15n East 290.4 feet; thence North 
89°53!20n East 150.0 feet to the point of beginning, 
containing less the following exception, 104.87 acres. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the interest of the grantors, Jean Smith 
Sanders and Joyce Smith Goodfellow in the following portion 
thereof: Beginning at a point 33.0 feet North 0°05,15n East 
along the Section line and South 89°53,20fl West 1270.0 feet 
parallel to the South Section line from the Southeast corner 
of said Section 22, and running thence North 2607.0 feet, 
more or less, to the North line of the Southeast Quarter 
of said Section; thence South 89°56'55n West 90.0 feet along 
said North line; thence South 2607.0 feet to a point 33.0 
feet North of the South line of said section; thence North 
89°53!20n East 90.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
RETURNED 
MAY - 4 1999 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Cindy S. Hatch 
958 East Oakwood Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
E ± 5 i Q 2 5 6 B 2 * 9 3 P 2 0 S 
5HERYL L- WHITE/ DAVIS CNTY RECORDER 
1999 HAY 4 ?:Q0 AH FEE 16.00 DEP ITT 
REC'D FOR HATCH' CIHDY 
; x QUIT CLAIM DEED 
OO-OO
 T H I S Q U I T Q^JM D E E D / m a d e b y A L K A L I LIMITED, - by 
WILLIAM R. SMITH, MACK G. SMITH, JOHN LYNN SMITH and CINDY SMITH 
HATCH, being all of the partners of Alkali Limited, Grantor, to 
the Grantee hereinafter named. 
•WHEREAS, on or about September 25, 1978, Alkali 
14 raited, a Utah limited partnership, vas established by filing a 
written certificate of limited partnership with the State of Utah; 
and 
WHEREAS, Alkali Limited has failed to file documents 
required by the State of Utah to maintain the status of limited 
partnership; and 
WHEREAS, Alkali limited is new a general partnership. 
THEREFORE, for valuable consideration received, Grantor 
hereby QUIT CLAIMS to BMJC, L L C , of 958 East Oakwood Drive, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010, Grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars 
($10.00) and other good and valuable consideration, all of 
Grantor's right, title, and interest in the following described 
rqal property located in Davis County, State 
2 
of Utah; £ 1 5 1 0 2 5 6 B 2 4 9 3 P 2 0 9 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT 
WITNESS the hands of the general partners of Grantor 
this t 7 day of y ^ ^ - ^ C , 1999. 
•n—y 
ALKALI LIMITED 
COUNTY OF, t.-XX'VlAP' 
*>y UlKilli*rJk. IAJIL <£? 
OHN LYNN SMITH, p a r t n e r / 
CINDY SM TCH, p a r t n e r 
STATE OF fSst&b ) 
( s s . 
V) 
On the Z 7 day of ^JU^*'^ 1999, 
/ 
personally appeared before me WILLIAM R. SMITH, signer of the 
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same in his capacity as general partner of Alkali Limited, 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY P/OBLIC
 / 




5770 S.25QE. #115 
Murray, Utah 84107 
My Commfeslon Expkaa 
September 1,2002 
State of Utah 
STATE OF //6(pL* 
COUNTY OY^iMUlhX.) 
( s s . 
On the ^ 7 d ay of 
. F t l Q 2 5 < S B 2 4 9 3 F 2 1 0 
1599, 
personally appeared before me MACK G. SMITH, signer of the 
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same in his capacity as general partner of Alkali Limited. 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF Mskh ) 
COUNTY QV^frUfht'hl 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 /fj A 
Residing at: 
•jUlC T GregL Swenson 
5770 S. 250 E. #115 
Murray, Utah 84107 
1999, 
) 
On the ~Z7 day of ^ ^ ^ A / C 
personally appeared before me JOHN LYNN SMITH, signer of the 
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that he executed 
the same in his capacity as general partner of JU.kg.li Limited. 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF tfjhcA^. ) 
COUNTY OES&GTAW^L ) 
On t h e 2 7 
NOTARY PBBLIC 









personally appeared before me CINDY SMITH HATCH, signer of the 
foregoing Quit Claim Deed, who acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same in her capacity as general partner of Alkali 
L i m i t e d Notary Public Greg L. Swanson 
5770 S 250 E. #115 
Murray Utah B4107 
My Commission Expim* 
September 1,8002 
State of Utah 
/0^L£^/ v^^Q^g<^<—* 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g ' a t : 7VUt<*vu/' L 
SM1TH4/E99/W 
E1510256 B24?3P 
Beginning at a point North 0°05,15fl East 323.40 feet along 
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22y 
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
running thence North 0 OS'lS" East 617.0 feet along the 
East line of said Section; thence West 231.0 feet; thence 
North 0°05T15" East 379.60 feet parallel to the East Section 
line; thence East 231*0 feet; thence North 0 05f15u East 
1318.01 feet, more or less, to the East Quarter corner of 
said Section 22; thence South 89°56f55M West 1895.78 feet 
along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said sec-
tion to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56'55n East from the 
center of said section; thence South 0°02l17" West 2606-98 
feet parallel to the West line of said Southeast Quarter 
to a point 33.0 feet North"of the South line of said Sec-
tion; thence North 89°53r20n East 1743.53 feet, parallel 
to and 33.0 feet North of the South line of said section 
to a point 150,0 feet West of the East line of said section; 
thence North 0°05'15n East 290,4 feet; thence North 
3?°53'2QU East 150,0 feet to the point of beginning, 
containing less the following exception, 104.87 acres. 
Jean Smith Sanders and Joyce Smith Goodfellov in the 
following portion thereof: Beginning at a point 33.0 
feet North 0°05,,15,f East along "the Section line ..and J 
South 89°53\20u West 1270.0 feet,..parallel to'the South 
Section line from the Southeast corner of said Section 
22, and running thence North 2607.0 feet, more or less, 
to the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said Section: 
thence„„South 89°56J55" West 90 .Q .feet^along said North li^ ie; 
thence South 2607.0 feet to a point 33.0~feet North of the 
South line of said section? thence North 89°53r20" East 
90.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: DEC ~ 1 1997 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
SECURITY INVESTMNTCOMPANT^ 
Bountif i l ly County^bfbayls ,V •Sjj&te';'6fSutah/:;hereby dWVEYS ^ arid 
of Bountif u^ ^^  .the?;siim;<6J: !fien 
D o l l a r s a n ^ 
tract of land in Davis County/ State^ of Utah, tbrwit: 
Beginning 92*75 rods north 25.99 rods east from swsdorner 
Of SEC 23/ T2N-RlWr S ^ 
89*25' east :13l.84 rods/S southi5'2^j*<Ba^:l'-.82:::rpds/ 
south 8 ; 12 rods/nor th 8J9 * 26. >; i^t 1 ^2/^8 r bds to 
beginning^ containing^8.23^ acres. 
Also beginning 960.48 feet north from sw corner of SEC 
i3>^T2N-RlWj SkiM; east 412/5 t^t^ north 423*22 feet/ 
east 2191.27 feet, nbrthl64.34 f ^ 
south 100 feefc/ttesfc 4 1 2 ^ 
231 feet/ south 379.6 ieet/east 23!^feet, n ^ 
feet: to beginning, containing 14.90 acres. 
In all 23.13 acres. 
WITNESS the hands of said Grantor, this 30th day of November, 
1997* 
SECURITY INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation 
Nora A. Stable, 
President 
E i 3 6 4 2 < 5 l B 2 2 0 9 P 17«SB 
JAHESASHAUER/DAVIS CHTY RECORDER:^=3 
1997 DEC 1 3 4 : 1 5 W1 FEE 1 3 . 0 0 DEP DJU 
REC'D FOR STANlEr! NORA 
«»!«» 
STATE OF UTAH, ) ^
 £ ^ ^ ± , 2 2 o 9 p 1 7 6 S > 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On the 30th day of November, 1997, personally appeared before 
me NORA A. STAHLE who, being by me duly sworn, did say that she is 
President of Security Investment Company, a Utah Corporation, and 
that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of 
said Corporation by authority of a Resolution of its Board of 
Directors, and said NORA A. STAHLE duly acknowledged to me that 
said Corporation executed the saifle. 






OTATK (IT OTAM 
..' Notary Public ..y 
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DEED OF CONVEYANCE AND AGREEMENT jflll-^'* -fuJ 
377265 ^'AV^ '" 
WILLIAM HOWARD SMITH and LOIS G. SMITH, his wife; VERL 
REED SMITH and EVELYN SMITH, his wife; JOYCE SMITH GOODFELLOW, of 
Bountiful, Utah, and JEAN SMITH SANDERS of Kaysville, Utah, GRANTORS, 
of Davis County, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT as against 
the acts of the GRANTORS and those claiming by, through or under the 
GRANTORS, the following described tracts of land in Davis County, 
State of Utah, unto the GRANTEES of the separate tracts herein 
described as being conveyed to the stated, separate grantees, as 
follows: 
UNTO WILLIAM HOWARD SMITH and LOIS G. SMITH, his wife, 
as joint tenants of Bountiful, Utah, the following described tract: 
Beginning at a point North 0°05*15" East 323-40 feet along 
the Section line from the Southeast corner of Section 22, 
Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
running thence North 0°05f15ff East 617-0 feet along ohe 
East line of said Section; thence West 231-0 feet; thence 
v North 0°05!15" East 379-60 feet parallel to the East Section 
Ai line; thence East 231-0 feet; thence North 0°05,15n East 
LJ
 1318,01 feet, more or less, to the East Quarter corner of 
£ said Section 22; thence South &9° 56f 55" West 1895-78 feet, 
*« along the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said 
~o c> section to a point 750.68 feet North 89°56*55" E£st from 
«5 * the center of said section; thence South 0°02,17" Wes« 
*£ 2606,98 feet parallel to the West line of said Souuheast 
^ Quarter to a point 33-0 feet North of the South line 
D of said Section; thence North 89°53!20n East 1743-53 
feet, parallel to and 33-0 feet North of the South line 
~g of said section to a point 150.0 feet West of the East 
a line of said section; thence North 0°05r15" East 290-4 
§• feet; thence North 89°53,20" East 150.0 feet to the 
.9 point of beginning, containing less the following ex-
^ ception, 104-87 acres. EXCEPTING THEREFROM the interest 
of the grantors, Jean Smith Sanders and Joyce Smith 
Goodfellow in the following portion thereof: Beginning 
at a point 33-0 feet North 0°05?15" East along the Section 
line and South 89°53f20" West 1270.0 feet parallel to the 
South Section line from the Southeast corner of said 
Section 22, and running thence North 2607-0 feet, more or 
less, to the North line of the Southeast Quarter of said 
Section; thence South 89°56,55" West 90.0 feet along 
said North line; thence South 2607-0 feet to a point 
33.0 feet North of the South line of said section; 
thence North 89°53T20" East 90.0 feet to the point of 
beginning 
UNTO VERL REED SMITH and EVELYN SMITH, his wife, as joint 
tenants, of Bountiful, Utah, the following described tract: 
^fft Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 
<S> ^  2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
i y thence North 0°05T15" East 761.31 feet along the Section 
<jF line; thence South 89°34T East 1245-91 feet; thence South 
1287.61 feet, more or less, to the North line of a Highway, 
- 2 -
75 
50.0 feet perpendicularly distant Northerly from the 
center line thereof; thence South 89° 31* West 762.60 
feet, more or less, along said highway; thence Westerly 
65.O feet along said highway along the arc of a 550 
foot radius curve to the left; thence Westerly along 
the North line of 500 South street to the West line of 
Section 26, said Township and Range; thence North 0°19T54n 
East along said Section line to the point of beginning, 
containing 37-37 acres, more or less. 
UNTO JEAN SMITH SANDERS of Kaysville, Utah, the following 
described tracts: 
Beginning at a point 33.0 feet North 0°02r17" East along 
the Quarter Section line from the Southwest corner of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 22, Township 2 North, 
0- Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence 
,\> North 0°02T17" East 2607-76 feet along the Quarter Section 
^ line to the Northwest corner of said Southeast Quarter; 
thence North 89056f55" East 375-34 feet along the North 
line of said Quarter Section; thence South 0°02r17" West 
2607.37 feet to a point 33-0 feet North of the South line 
of said section; thence South 89°53r20" West 375-34 feet 
parallel to the South line of said section to the point 
of beginning, containing 22.47 acres, more or less. 
Beginning at a point North 0°15r15ft East 761.31 feet 
along the Section line and South 89°34f East 1517-38 
feet from the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 
2 Ncrth, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence South 89°34T East 261.90 feet to a point due 
•Lj North of a point 52.25 rodF West along the Section line 
^ty from the South Quarter corner of said Section 23; thence 
w>' Ko South 748.50 feet to said Section line; thence South 
P *r 89°58*45" East 2.15 feet along said Section line; thence 
VV South 5° East 532.20 feet, more or less, along the West 
^ line of the property conveyed to Rulon G. Ashworth by 
Warranty Deed recorded Jan. 25, I960, in Book 180, Page 
446 of Official Records, to the North line of a highway, 
50.0 feet perpendicularly distant Northerly from the 
center line thereof; thence South 89°31f West 310.43 
feet, more or less, along said highway to a point due 
South of the point of beginning; thence North 1283.27 
feet, more or less, to the point of beginning, containing 
8.01 acres, more or less. 
UNTO DON E. G00DFELL0W and JOYCE SMITH G00DFELL0W, his 
wife, as joint tenants, of Bountiful, Utah, the following described 
tracts: 
Beginning at a point North 0°02f17Tf East 33-0 feet along 
the Quarter Section line and North 89053*20" East 375-34 
A feet parallel to the South line of said Section from the 
**).*" Southwest corner of the Southeast Quarter of Section 22, 
\\' Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
D
 running thence North 89°53r20" East 375-34 feet; thence 
North 0°02!17" East 2606.98 feet to the North line of said 
Quarter Section; thence South 89°56'55" West 375-34 feet 
along said North line; thence South Wt^Y]"1 West 2607-37* 
feet to the point of beginning, containing 22-47 acres, 
more or less. 
o Beginning at a point North 0°05f15" East 761.31 feet along 
^\s the Section line and South 89°34? East 1245-91 feet from 
lr\A* the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 2 North, 
^y Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence South 
>'* 89°34r East 271-47 feet; thence South 1283-27 feet, more 
or less, to the North line of a Highway, 50.0 feet 
- 3 -
76 
perpendicularly distant Northerly from the center line 
thereof; thence South 89°31! West 271.47 feet along said 
highway; thence North 1287.61 feet, more or less, to 
the point of beginning, containing 8.01 acres, more or 
less. 
Excepting and reserving unto the Grantors, other then 
Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, an easement for ingress and 
egress and eventual street purposes to the extent necessary to 
provide a street 50 feet in width which may be accomplished by 
use of the existing 33-0 foot right-of-way adjoining the South 
boundary of the said Southeast Quarter of Section 22, owned by 
Jordan Fur and Reclamation Co., or at the option of the Grantors 
other than Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, the easement can be 
relocated before dedication as a public street within an area up 
to 300 feet Northerly from the South boundary of said Southeast 
Quarter of said Section 22. 
Excepting and reserving and granting to the Grantors and 
Grantees easements for irrigation ditches and for pipelines as the 
main ditches and pipelines are presently located for irrigation of 
the tracts conveyed to the Grantees herein, with the right of the 
servient owner to relocate the said ditches or pipelines or to 
change the same in form so long as the irrigation water is delivered 
to the dominant tenement in substantially the same place the ease-
ment enters the dominant tenement land unless the dominant tene-
ment agrees otherwise. 
Excepting and reserving unto the Grantors William Howard 
Smith and Lois G. Smith, as joint tenants, an undivided 355°; unto 
Verl Reed Smith and Evelyn Smith, as joint tenants, an undivided 
35$; unto Don E. Goodfellow and Joyce Smith Goodfellow, as joint 
tenants, an undivided 15$; and unto Jean Smith Sanders, an undivided 
15$, in and to the underground water rights in the property above 
described as being within Sections 23 and 26, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, including but not limited to the Certificate of 
Appropriation of Water, No. 7009, recorded October 18, 196? in the 
office of the Davis County Recorder in Book 329, Page 30L. and to 
the rights represented by Change Application No. 31-1^57, A-3921 
in the office of the State Engineer of the State of Utah. The 
parties hereto agree that the- said underground water will be permitted 
to flow westerly for continuous use by all parties hereto in the 
proportions above stated and particularly for stock watering purposes. 
It is agreed that the parties herein who are designated 
joint tenants of a particular tract are also joint tenants of the 
interest of the other joint tenant in the 90 feet by 2607.O feet 
tract excepted from the first above-described tract. , 
"£> 
WITNESS the hands of the parties this,. _day of 
February, 1973• 
William Howard Smith 
^6is <Jtf ,Smith _ .. j 
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* JT EXHIBIT 21 
No. 73707 WARRANTY DEED, 
John L. Hatch and Delia M. Hatch, Husband and wife, and Laura L. H. Eskelson, 
| grantors woods Cross, County of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY AND WARRANT to 
Kamas, Wasatch, 
Security Investment Company, A Utah Corporation, grantee of for the sum of Ten Dollars 
and other good and valuable considerations the following tract of land in Davis County, 
State of Utah, 
i! Commencing at a point 52.76 rods North and 25.48 rods East and North 2° 1Q< 
j East 16.92 rods, being the point of commencement'of boundary from the southwest corner 
I of the southwest quarter of Section 23, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian, United States Survey, and running thence North 2° 10* East 13.08 rods) thence 
South 89° 28* East 132.76 rods; thence South 5° 30* East 13.03 rods* thence North 89° 
31» West 133.33 rods to the place of commencement, containing 10.90 acres, more or lesst 
WITNESS the hands of said grantors, this 15th day of December A. D. 1939 
Signed in the presence of John L. Hatch 
State of Utah, \ 
ss. 
County of Davis \ 
"DOCUMENTARY! 
Delia M. Hatch 
Laura L. H. Eskelson 
On the 15th day of December A. D. 1939 personally appeared before me John L. 
S Hatch and Delia M. Hatch, Husband and Wife, the signers of the within instrument, who 
j duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
My Commission expires ^ ^ ^ ^ Henry W Stahle 
March 22, 1941. ff /SBA!\ Notary Public residing 
\ ^ ^ ^ at Bountiful, Utah. 
I STATE OF UTAH, 1 
s SS. 
COUNTY OF WASATCH. t 
On the 29th day of February A. D M 1940, personally appeared before me Laura 
L. H. Eskelson, the signer of the within instrument who duly acknowledged to me that 
she executed the same. 
j Commission Expires 1 ^^"^^ DeVan Eskelson 
I Oct. 30th, 1943 (( (&BAfi\ \ Notary Public 
Residence* Kamas, Utah. 
I Recorded March 20th, 1940 at 11*40 A. M. Abstracted ^//^ 
J@L X.jfi£t<fc Vtcs: ?& £</, County Recorder 
No. 73708 WARRANTY DEED 
Alvin W, Hatch and Elizabeth J, Hatch, his wife, grantors, of Woods Cross, 
County of Davis, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY AflP YfARRANT to Ancel Hatch, grantee? of 
Woods Cross, Davis County, Utah, for the sua of ?EN ($10,$>P) DOLLARS, the following 
described tract of land in — C o u n t y , State of Utahi 
Commencing at a point 561 feet North from the Southeast corner of Section 22, 
f Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, U, 8. Survey 1 running thence West 
231 feetj thenoe North 379,4 feetj thence East 231 feetj thence South 379.4 feet to 
the place of commencement, containing 2.00 acres, more or leas. 
\t>(L O 
JT EXHIBIT 22 
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
My commission expires; / ^ ^ ^ \ Frank Crpft 
Feb. 12, 1948 (( fefiALJ J Notary Public 
^--x^ Residing at Farmmgton, Utah 
Recorded February/23, 1945 at 11:25 A.M. Abstracted /-///- tut 
^ ^ ^ c ^ e ^ C County Recorder 
? 
No. 88811 SALE AGREEMENT ( 
THIS AGREEMENT made at Salt Lake City, Utah this 1st day of November, 1944J, 
between ANCEL HATCH and AMY A. HATCH, husband and wif«, residents of Woods Cross, « 
Davis County, Utah, sellers, and WILLIAM GUFFEY and JOSEPHINE A. GUFfEY, his wife, \ 
residents of Yfoods Cross, Davis County, Utah, buyers, Y/ITNESSETH: j 
That the sellers hereby agree to sell and the buyers agree to buy upon the 
t 
terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, the following described real and personal 
property owned by the sellers and located in Davis County, State of Utah, consist- \ 
ing of approximately 385.95 acres of land and the personal property hereinafter des-
cribed, said real property is described as followa, to-wit: 1 
i 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 23, Township 2 North, Range j 
1 West, running thence North 376.2 feet} thence East 793.93 feet; thence South { 
914.1 feetj thence West 793-98 feet; thence North 573.9 feet to beginning, contain-^ 
ing 16.65 acres, more or less. J 
The East half of the Southwest quarter of section 22, Township 2 North, j 
Range 1 West, containing 80 acres, more or less. j 
The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22, Township 2 « 
i 
North, Range 1 Y/est, containing 40.00 acres, more or less. \ 
Beginning 180 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township { 
2 North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rods; thence North 60 rods; thence j 
East 160 rods; thence South 60 rods to beginning, containing 60 acres, more or less. 
Beginning 130 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2 
North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rods; thence North 50 rodsj thence jj 
East 160 rodsj thence South 50 rods to beginning, containing 50 acres, more or less. 
Beginning 80 rods North of the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2 t 
j 
North, Range 1 West, running thence West 160 rodsj thence North 50 rods; thence ; 
j; 
East 160 rods; thence South 50 rods to beginning, containing 50 acres, more or less. 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22, Township 2 North, Range ; 
j 1 West, running thence North 34 rods; thence West 14 rodsj thence North 46 rodsj
 f 
thence West 146 rodsj thence South 80 rodsj thence East 160 rods to beginning, con-J 
i 
taining 76 acres, more or less. j 
Commencing at a point 561 feet North from the Southeast corner of Section | 
22, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, running thence West 231 feet; thence North i 
I 
379.4 feetj thence East 231 feetj thence South 379.4 feet to beginning,containing g 
2.00 acres, more or less. \ 
Commencing at a point 18.80 chains East from the Northwest corner of sec- J 
tion 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, running thence South 8.15 chains, thence jj 
East 8.77 chainsj thence North 5° West 8.20 chains; thence North 5.56 chainsj thence 
North89°37» West 8.49 chains j thence South 5.63 chains to beginning, containing ij 
11.30 acres, more or less, I 
also the following personal propertyi All of the livestock including 37 head of j 
cows, calves and steers and 4 head of horses and all harnesses and farm implements ,' j 
upon the property including tractor, mower, and all other farm equipment now located 
on said property above described. !* 
The total purchase price for said property, real and personal, is the sum ? 
of $15,000.00 and said sum is payable to the sellers in the amounts and at the times• 
n 
as followsi #1,000.00 on the date hereof, the receipt of which is hereby acknow- .' 
ledged, the balance, $14,000.00 to bear interest at the rate of 4$ per annum from f 
the date hereof until paid, interest to cease on principal payments as oiadej ' 
$4,000.00 together with the a-nnual interest to that date on or before 2 years from j 
date and the balance of $10,000.00 payable $600.00 per year together with yearly • \ 
interest payments until the entire purchase price is paid. The buyers shall have 1 
the right to pay any amount or all of the balance of the purchase price at any time; 
The purchasers agree to sell all the male cattle of said cattle purchased j 
and to apply the sales price and pay the same to the sellers, the amount received ' 
i 
to be applied upon the balance of principal to be paid. 
The sellers agree to furnish to the buyers abstract of title to the pro- i( 
perty above described showing an uneracumbered fee simple marketable title in the |> 
sellers satisfactory to the attorneys of the buyers and to execute, sign and r 
acknowledge a deed to said property in favor of the buyers so that the same may be 1 
delivered to the buyers at any time hereafter that the buyers shall have made full > 
payment of the purchase price of the property- j 
The sellers agree to pay the taxes on the property for the year 1944 and | 
i; 
the buyers are to be entitled to and have taken possession of the property and ? 
H 
agree to pay the taxes thereafter on the property on or before the date when the j 
8 
taxes may become delinquent. ' { \ 
It is agreed that if the sellers accept payments from the buyers on this * 
c 
contract less than according to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing it a 
i 
will in no way alter the terms of the contract and all payments made by the buyers,}; 
if any, in excess of the payments herein stipulated may at the option of the buyers« 
be applied on future payments. | 
The buyers agree to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on the I 
t 
premises insured with a company acceptable to the seller in the amount of $2500.00 ? 
and to assign said insurance to the sellers as their interest may appear. ' 
In the event the buyers default in the payment of taxes or insurance as 
provided herein or in the event that the buyers fail to pay a total of $5,000.00 
on said purchase price on or before two years from date and the sellers make •; 
written demand upon the buyers to remedy their default in any of said particulars 
and shall fail to remedy said default within 90 days after said written notice and J 
demand, then, in that event, the sellers shall at their option be released from all"1 
obligations to convey said property and all payment which have been made thereon 
on this contract by the buyers shall be forfeited to the sellers as liquidated I 
damages for the non-performance of this contract. \ 
The sellers on receiving the full purchase price to be paid as herein pro-!! 
vided agree to deliver to the buyers a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying t 
Jfee_ premAggj_J'?eel and clear of all encumbrances except as may_have accrued by or * 
through the acts or neglect of the buyers and to furnish at their expense as afore-J 
said an abstract or abstracts of title brought bo date of the delivery of the deed;, 
the title to be marketable and acceptable to the buyers. 
The buyers and sellers each agree that should they default in any of the
 r 
covenants and agreements contained herein to pay all costs and expenses tnat may * 
arise from enforcing this agreement, either by suit or otherwise, including a I 
A 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 5 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed 
their names as of the 1st day of November, 1944* 
WITNESS: Ancel Hatch 
Amy A Hatch I 
Oscar W Moyle William Guffey f 
Josephine A. Guffey jj 
STATE OF UTAH I j 
: ss ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE J j 
On this 1st day of November, 194-4, personally appeared before me ANCCL
 ( 
HATCH and AMY A. HATCH, husband and wife, the signers of the above instrument, who « 
duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. jj 
Commission Expires /^==^\ 0s°ar Y/ Moyle \ 
Oct. 30, 1948 | (SEALJ JJ Notary Public 
^is-sss^ Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Recorded February 24, 1945 at 12s 25 P.M. Abstracted at,, a A/- /*> * 
A3- Ay-/*/ \ 
_County Recorder 
No. 88836 UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY J 
POLE LINE EASEMENT ? 
i . r 
Benjamin Clegg and Cora Mae Clegg his wife, Grantors, of Davis County,
 u 
Utah, hereby convey and warrant to UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation, its ' 
successors in Interest and assigns, Grantee, for the sum of One ($1.00) ^ Dollar and ^  
> / ' 
other valuable consideration', a perpetual easement and right of way for (the erection 
I t ' 
and continued maintenance, repair, alteration, and replacement of the electric i 
/ | 1 1 
transmission, distribution and telephone circuits of the Grantee, and/L guy anchor J 
and 2 poles, with the necessary guys, /stubs, crossarras and other attachments there-
/ / / \ 
on, or affixed thereto, for the support of said circuits, to be erected and main-
tained upon and/across the premises of the Grantors, In Davis Counjty, Utah, along 
a line described as follows: 
Beginning at existing pole! on grantor's land at a points 520 feet north and 
1085 feet we^st, more or less, from/the east quarter corner of Section 27, T. 2 H., 1 
R. 1 ¥/., S.L.B.& M., thence runnink N. 19°141 E. 858 feet to i"ence on north boundary 
I F / \ 
line of said land and being in the* BEi of NEi of Section Zll \ 
'of ingress and egress necessary or convenient for,. 
the full/and complete use, occupation and enjoyment of/the easement hereby granted/ 
/ T / \ 
and all rights and privileges incident thereto, including the right to cut and , 
remove timber, trees, brush, overhanging branches/and other obstructions which may * 
injure or interfere with the Grantee's u^ -e-^ -o^ ccupation, or enjoyment of this ease- \ 
ment. \ 
together with all rights 5 
